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THE TORTUOUS HISTORY OF THE
KYL AMENDMENT
Marilou M. King'
COMMONLY CALLED THE KYL AMENDMENT, Sec-
tion 4507 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA)1 amended
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act2 to permit private contract-
ing between physicians and Medicare beneficiaries. Under Section
4507, the circumstances under which private contracting is per-
mitted are expressly limited, so much so, in fact, that proponents
of private contracting deem the provision practically ineffectual
and have sought to have it amended by Congress, rulemaking, and
the federal courts. As codified, the provision requires that physi-
cians opt out of Medicare entirely for a period of two years in or-
der to contract privately with one or more Medicare beneficiaries.3
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF
PRIVATE CONTRACTING
The question of whether physicians could enter into private
contracts with beneficiaries first arose with the enactment of
Medicare provisions designed to contain the costs of medical
services and to prevent physicians from shifting uncontained costs
to Medicare Part B beneficiaries. In a Medicare system re-designed
to protect beneficiaries, private contracting, though it increased
beneficiaries' freedom of choice, circumvented financial safe-
guards. Provisions creating financial safeguards appeared to be at
odds with older provisions proclaiming the interests of beneficiar-
ies in freedom from interference from the government and freedom
to select their providers.4
t Partner, McDermott, Will & Emery in Washington, D.C.; former Executive
Vice President, American Health Lawyers Association. The Author is grateful to Inez
de Crombrugghe for her assistance in the research and writing of this Article.
' 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395a(a), (b)
2 42 U.S.C.A. §1395 et seq.
3 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395a(b)(3)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring physi-
cians to sign affidavits providing that they will not submit Medicare claims).
4 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 (West Supp. 1992):
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal offi-
cer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of
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Beginning in 1984, Congress enacted a number of new Medi-
care provisions restricting reimbursement practices. Some of the
most relevant restrictions include the creation of participation
plans, the imposition of charge limits, and the mandatory submis-
sion of all claims. Physicians were given incentives to become
participating physicians and to agree to accept assignment of each
beneficiary's payment.5 Participating physicians had to accept a
reasonable charge as full payment, and were prohibited from bal-
ance billing their patients.6 Non-participating physicians were lim-
ited in the amount they could charge beneficiaries and could not
bill beneficiaries for unassigned fees for services that were not
medically necessary.7 Finally, physicians were required to submit
all claims for beneficiaries, whether or not they had accepted as-
signment.8
Under these restrictions, it was neither clear whether physi-
cians should submit claims for services that Medicare may not
cover, nor whether a physician could contract privately with a pa-
tient willing to forego coverage and waive the claims submission
requirement.
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) took the
position, not surprisingly, that physicians could not circumvent the
intended effects of these laws by contracting privately with pa-
tients. Its position, however, was not clearly articulated in any law,
regulation, or rule issued by the agency. The position developed,
as one commentator described it, as a kind of subterranean policy,
articulated through letters to carriers and in bulletins passed on to
medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided, or over the
selection, tenure, or compensation of any officer or employee of any insti-
tution, agency, or person providing health services; or to exercise any su-
pervision or control over the administration or operation of any such insti-
tution, agency or person.
Id.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395a(a) (West Supp. 1999) (providing that "[a]ny individual
entitled to insurance benefits under this subchapter may obtain health services from
any institution, agency, or person qualified to participate under this subchapter if such
institution, agency, or person undertakes to provide him such services").
5 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395u(h) (West Supp. 1999) (providing requirements and
benefits of participating physicians).
6 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395u(b)(3)(A), (G) (West Supp. 1999).
7 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395u(j) (West Supp. 1999) (creating and describing
maximum allowable actual charges); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-4(g) (West Supp. 1999)
(imposing a limitation on beneficiary liability).
8 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-4(g)(4) (West Supp. 1999) (discussing submission
of claims by physicians and other practitioners).
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physicians. 9 HCFA's position may have been implied from exist-
ing laws and regulations because private contracting could poten-
tially erode the financial protections afforded beneficiaries. But the
lack of any clear directive made private contracting a risky venture
for physicians who feared being sanctioned.
In Stewart v. Sullivan, 10 a physician in New Jersey wanted to
contract privately with several of her Medicare patients. She had
received a number of bulletins from Medicare carriers, including
one that stated that Medicare laws "cannot be bypassed by having
patients sign a disclaimer stating that services provided to them
should not be billed to Medicare.""1 The physician also received a
letter from the administrator of HCFA that stated, in relevant part:
[A private agreement] initiated by a physician would be
invalid. In the rare event, however, that a patient, for his or
her own reasons, and entirely independently, chooses not
to use Part B coverage, the law does not require the sub-
mission of a claim by the physician. Where patients have
Part B enrollment, a patient can choose not to use Part B
coverage for certain physician services. However, by law
the physician is still required to follow certain Medicare
requirements other than the claims submission require-
ment. This would include the limiting charge provision
applicable to a nonparticipating physician when assign-
ment is not accepted, or advance written notice to the pa-
tient when the physician furnishes services which are not
considered reasonable and necessary under Medicare
guidelines.' 2
Fearing sanctions for privately contracting with her patients, the
physician filed suit in United States District Court of New Jersey
for a declaration of rights and injunctive relief. In October 1992,
the suit was dismissed for lack of ripeness; the plaintiff had failed
to establish that HCFA had a clearly articulated policy on private
contracting. 13 Even though the communications sent to the physi-
9 See JOHN S. HOFF, MEDICARE PRIVATE CONTRACTING: PATERNAUSM OR
AuTONOMY? 6-11 (1998) (describing the history behind Section 4507).
10 816 F. Supp. 281 (D.N.J. 1992) (dismissing a challenge of a Department of
Health and Human Services policy which prohibited physicians from entering into
private contracts for treatment on a case-by-case basis).
" Id. at285.
12 id.
"3 See id at 289-90.
2000]
HEALTH MATRIX
cian appeared to prohibit private contracting and threatened sanc-
tions, the judge found that there was confusion regarding their ori-
gin and that HCFA had not promulgated rules or regulations for-
mally espousing the policy.14
In June 1993, following the Stewart decision, HCFA released
Section 3044 of the Medicare Carriers Program Manual entitled
"Effect of Beneficiary Agreements Not to Use Medicare Cover-
age."' 15 The section instructed carriers that "[a]greements with
Medicare beneficiaries purportedly waiving Federal requirements
have no legal force or effect. Physicians who treat Medicare Part B
beneficiaries must comply with the law or be subject to Federal
penalties. ' 6 This instruction, like the bulletins in the Stewart case,
did not have the force of law, but it clearly indicated that HCFA
would not recognize private contracting.
In response to HCFA's unofficial prohibition of private con-
tracting, legislators attempted to clarify the right to contract.
H. SENATOR KYL'S FIRST BILL
In September 1995, Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) introduced a bill
entitled "Senior Citizens Health Care Freedom to Contract Act of
1995" that would permit private contracting between patients and
physicians on a case-by-case basis.17 The bill stated, in relevant
part: "Nothing in this title shall prohibit a physician or other pro-
vider from entering into a private contract with a Medicare benefi-
ciary for health services for which no claim for payment is to be
submitted under this title."' 8 The bill also specified that actual
charge limitations did not apply to services provided under private
contract. The bill was referred to the Committee on Finance, but
lawmakers did not take any further action.
14 See id.
15 See Electronic Media Claims, B3 3044: Effect of Beneficiary Agreements Not
to Use Medicare Coverage, HCFA PROGRAM MANUALS: MEDICARE CARRIERS PART 3
(June 1993) (on file with Health Matrix).
16 id.
17 See S. 1289, 104th Cong. (1995). The language of the bill did not contain a
two-year prohibition on Medicare participation for physicians electing to contract
privately with Medicare beneficiaries.
1s Id.
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M. MODIFIED VERSION OF FIRST BILL
INTRODUCED
In June 1997, Senator Kyl moved to have Amendment No.
468, a modified version of the Senior Citizens Health Care Free-
dom to Contract Act, included in the Senate version of the Bal-
anced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). 19 In his remarks upon introduc-
ing the bill, Senator Kyl commented that the bill was a necessary
response to HCFA's interpretations of the 1994 technical amend-
ments to the Medicare statutes. Specifically, he stated:2
The Health Care Financing Administration [HCFA] inter-
prets this change as expanding existing restrictions on pri-
vate payments in Medicare cases in which claims are filed,
to all cases involving Medicare enrolled individuals, re-
gardless of whether a claim is filed.
If HCFA imposes this interpretation through regulations
reportedly now being drafted, HCFA would have the
authority to completely prohibit Medicare enroll[ees] who
do not submit reimbursement claims to HCFA, and who do
not have claims submitted on their behalf, and who are
willing to pay their own bills in full - from paying non-
Medicare physicians out of pocket for needed Medicare-
covered services.21
Senator Kyl also noted that a recent poll revealed that sixty
percent of Americans felt they should be able to supplement gov-
ernment payments with their own funds to get "unrationed health
services." 22 Furthermore, HCFA's interpretations would "end the
practice of cost shifting, whereby doctors have an incentive to treat
more Medicare patients who can't afford to supplement Medi-
care's low reimbursement rate with funds from those who choose
to pay out of pocket."23
'" See 143 CONG. REC. S6258-59 (daily ed. June 24, 1997) (statement of Senator
Domenici, for Senator Kyl to amend the Senate version of the Balanced Budget Act,
S.947, 105th Cong. (1997)).
20 See 143 CONG. REc. S6383 (daily ed. June 25, 1997) (statement of Senator
Kyl).
21 id.
22 See id. at S6384 (citing a Nov. 5, 1996, Wirthlin Worldwide Poll).
23id.
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In order to ensure that the bill would survive a budget point-
of-order challenge, the 1995 language was modified to include a
short phrase that limited the ability to enter private contracts to
those providers who did not provide items or services under Medi-
care.24 Under this language, the bill permitted providers who had
never participated, or who agreed not to participate in Medicare, to
enter into private contracts.25 The bill did not specify the length of
any time period for which a provider would be required to opt-out.
With these vaguely worded modifications, the bill survived the
budget point-of-order challenge and was sent to the Conference
Committee as part of the Senate's Balanced Budget Act.
6
IV. SECTION 4507
The Conference Committee made significant alterations quali-
fying the right to contract privately before incorporating the bill
into Section 4507 of the BBA. The most controversial of these was
a provision requiring physicians to opt out of Medicare for two
years. Apparently, the Conference Committee inserted the two-
year restriction in the late stages of the budget talks, under threat
of veto of the entire budget by the Clinton administration.
27
According to Chris Jennings, the deputy assistant to the Presi-
dent for health policy development, the Administration had called
for the two-year restriction to ensure that seniors could make in-
24 See 143 CONG. REC. S6259 (daily ed. June 29, 1997) (Kyl Amend. No. 468)
(clarifying the use of private contracts for health services); Letter from co-sponsoring
Senators Jon Kyl and Don Nickles and Congressmen Bill Archer and Bill Thomas to
Colleagues in Congress (Sept. 18, 1997) (on file with Health Matrix).
25 See Letter from co-sponsoring Senators Jon Kyl and Don Nickles and Con-
gressmen Bill Archer and Bill Thomas to Colleagues in Congress, supra note 24
(advocating that physicians should be able to enter into private agreements on a pa-
tient-by-patient or case-by-case basis).
26 See id. (stating that the bill survived the challenge by a vote of 64-35 on June
25, 1997).
27 See 143 CONG. REC. S12080 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (statement of Senator
Kyl) (discussing the Medicare Beneficiary Freedom to Contract Act). See also Medi-
care: Kyl Pushing Bill Favored by AMA to Change Private Contract Provision, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 181, at A-32 (Sept 18, 1997) (reporting Kyl's wishes
to restore the original language and intent of the bill by eliminating the two-year re-
striction). The official legislative history of Section 4507 is silent on the circum-
stances surrounding the modification and simply summarizes the additional provi-
sions regarding beneficiary protections, contract requirements, including the two-year
restriction, and affidavit requirements. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-217, at 777
(1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 398-99.
[Vol. 10:51
TORTUOUS HISTORY OF THE KYL AMENDMENT
formed decisions when deciding who should treat them.2 The
Administration believed patients would not be able to know in ad-
vance whether a physician would seek private payment absent the
two-year restriction.
Senator Kyl has remarked that the modification occurred
without his knowledge, late at night, when a member of the House
and a member of the Senate "compromised with the Administra-
tion... and inserted a poison pill." 29 However, Senator Kyl has
also characterized Section 4507 as an improvement over both
HCFA's prior interpretations of the law and the Senate-endorsed
version of the provision. 30
Section 4507, as enacted, imposes the following requirements:
First, a private contract between the patient and physician must be
in writing.31 It must be entered into before any service is provided,
and it may not be entered into when the beneficiary is "facing an
emergency or urgent health care situation. '32 Second, the contract
must contain particular items alerting the beneficiary of his obli-
gations.33 The beneficiary must (i) agree not to submit a claim
even if the services are covered by Medicare, (ii) accept responsi-
bility for payment and acknowledge that Medicare will not reim-
burse for the services, (iii) acknowledge that actual charge limits
do not apply to the services, and (iv) acknowledge that Medigap
plans will not cover the services. 34 In addition, the contract must
indicate whether the physician is excluded from participation in
2s See Administration Opposes Senator's Attempt to Change Contracting Rule,
BNA DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTIVFs 1997 DER 182, at D-6 (Sept. 19, 1997) available
in LEXIS [hereinafter Administration] (adding also that the Administration considers
it too soon to debate the hospital transfer provision).
29 Senator Jon Kyl et al., Private Doctor-Patient Agreements: How the Medicare
Law Forbids Free Choice, Address at the" Heritage Foundation Lecture (June 30,
1998), in 620 HERAGE LE ruREs <httpJ/www.heritage.org/heritage/library/lecture/
h1620.html> (presenting Senator Kyl's views regarding HCFA's ability to impose
rules and regulations on patients within and outside the scope of Medicare).
30 See Letter from co-sponsoring Senators Jon Kyl and Don Nickles and Con-
gressmen Bill Archer and Bill Thomas to Colleagues in Congress, supra note 24
(qualifying that this improvement would still constrain the ability of Medicare bene-
ficiaries to contract privately with physicians).
31 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997 § 4507, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395a(a), (b) (West
Supp. 1999).
32Id.
31 See id.
3 See id.
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Medicare under section 1320a-7 (which excludes physicians for
numerous reasons, including fraud and abuse).35
In addition to the written contract requirements, Section 4507
requires physicians to file an affidavit with the secretary of HHS
averring that they will not submit claims for covered services for
an opt-out period of two years.
To enforce the affidavit requirement, Section 4507 provides
that if a physician knowingly and willfully submits a claim during
the opt-out period, "this subsection shall not apply.., to any items
and services provided by the physician or practitioner pursuant to
any contract on and after the date of such submission and before
the end of such period," and that "no payment shall be made" for
those same services .36
One commentator noted that the language of the enforcement
provision is opaque and probably the result of last-minute draft-
ing.37 The commentator hypothesized that Section 4507 at one
point imposed a two-year opt-out period as a sanction for fraudu-
lent double-billing under case-by-case private contracting, but that
once the two-year preclusion became a prerequisite for private
contracting, the enforcement provision no longer made sense.38
HCFA only recently addressed how it will interpret the enforce-
ment provision.39 A physician who violates the agreement not to
file claims during the opt-out period will still be required to submit
claims under the mandatory claims rule, although HCFA will deny
the claim pursuant to the enforcement provision, and the physician
will be bound by limiting charges.40
V. REACTION TO SECTION 4507
Proponents of private contracting reacted negatively to the
two-year opt-out provision. Members of the American Medical
Association (AMA) expressed their belief that the two-year re-
35 See id.
36 Balanced Budget Act § 4507 (b)(i)-(ii); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395a(b)(3)(C)(i)-(ii)
(West Supp. 1999).
37 See Alice G. Gosfield, Private Contracting by Medicare Physicians: The Pit
and The Pendulum, 26 HEALTH LAW DIG. (NHLA/AAHA, Washington, D.C.), Jan.
1998, at 3, 5, 6 (providing background and critical analysis of the Kyl amendment).
38 See id. at 6.
39 See Health Care Financing Admin., Program Memorandum (last modified
Apr. 10, 1998) <http://www.hcfa.gov/pubformsltransnitb981260.htm> (explaining
how HCFA should implement § 4507 of the Balanced Budget Act).
40 See id.
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striction effectively "emasculated" the provision and created a
"non-functioning" program.4' Senator Kyl criticized the provision
in remarks on the floor, claiming that the provision "makes it vir-
tually impossible for patients to actually have the benefit of...
freedom of choice." 42 Indeed, HCFA reported that in the first
quarter following the provision's enactment, only 300 physicians
and practitioners submitted affidavits to opt out of Medicare. 43 Of
the 300, almost half were psychiatrists. 44 Statistics from the De-
partment of Health and Human Services indicated that in 1997,
approximately 691,000 physicians and practitioners were enrolled
in the participating physician program.
45
VI. SENATOR KYL'S NEW BILL
On September 18, 1997, Senator Kyl introduced S. 1194, a
bill entitled "Medicare Beneficiar[y] Freedom to Contract Act of
1997," amending Section 4507 to eliminate the two-year preclu-
sion. 6 Congressman Bill Archer (R-TX) introduced an identical
bill, H.R. 2497,47 in the House. Kyl's bill makes explicit the right
to contract privately and does not require that the physician opt-out
of Medicare for any period of time. It provides that the Secretary
of HHS or an organization offering a Medicare+Choice plan will
receive the minimum information necessary to avoid payment for
any services provided under the contract. The bill also retains the
requirement of a written contract. A written contract must contain
terms acknowledging that (1) no claims may be submitted for
services; (2) that the beneficiary is liable in full for the services
provided; (3) that limiting charges do not apply to such services;
(4) that supplemental policies do not apply to such services; and
(5) that the beneficiary has the right to seek services from another
physician for whom payment would be made under Medicare. Fi-
nally, the bill excludes contracts with beneficiaries enrolled in
41 See Administration, supra note 28, at D-6 (quoting AMA members during a
question and answer period following Jennings' address to the AMA).
42 143 CONG. REc. S12080, supra note 27, at S12080.
43 See HCFA Says 300 Physicians Opted Out of Medicare to Contract Privately,
6 HEALTH CARE PoL'Y REP. (BNA), May 4, 1998, available in LEXIS (adding that
seven specialties accounted for eighty percent of the physicians showing affidavits).
44 See id.
45 See id. (noting that the array of services provided by those physicians ac-
counted for more than ninety-two percent of Medicare-allowed charges).
46 S. 1194, 105h Cong. (1997).
47 H.R. 2497, 105th Cong. (1997).
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Medical Savings Account (MSA) plans under Part C from the
written contract requirements.
While S. 1194 was being considered, Senator Kyl, fearing that
HCFA would adopt an unduly restrictive interpretation of Section
4507, placed a hold on the Clinton administration's nominee for
administrator of HCFA, Nancy-Ann Min DeParle.48 Once Senator
Kyl gained assurances from HCFA and the Administration that the
agency's interpretations of Section 4507 would not affect the pro-
vision of non-covered and conditionally covered services, and that
the agency would seek to maximize beneficiaries' choice of physi-
cians, he withdrew his objection to the nomination.49
VII. THE SENATE HEARINGS
In February 1997, the Senate Finance Committee held hear-
ings to evaluate the provisions of S.1194. Witnesses testifying in
opposition to the measure included representatives from HCFA,
the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), and the
American College of Physicians. Witnesses testifying to support
the measure included the United Seniors Association, and the
AMA.
The administrator of HCFA, Nancy-Ann Min DeParle, testi-
fied that a two-year opt-out provision was essential to diminish the
opportunities for fraud and abuse in selective private contracting
and to ensure that beneficiaries could make an informed choice of
physicians.50 Fraud and abuse will be kept at a minimum under the
opt-out period because Medicare carriers will be able to identify
non-participating physicians and therefore prevent double billing.
Beneficiaries will be able to make informed choices in selecting
their physicians because they will know the extent of their finan-
48 See Washington Health Briefs: While HCFA Designee's Stalls Again, 23
HEALTH LGis. & REG. 43 (Oct. 29, 1997). See also Physician Contracting: Kyl
Amendment Stirs Controversy, HEALTH LNE (Nov. 5, 1997).
49 See Senator John Kyl, Significant Guarantees Achieved: Kyl Makes Progress
with HCFA Nominee on Medicare Private Contracting, Cong. Press Releases, Fed-
eral Document Clearing House, Nov. 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legislation &
Politics Library, U.S. Congress Library, FDCH Congressional Press Releases File
(applauding Senator Kyl for obtaining assurances from the nominee to head HCFA
and from Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala that Medicare pa-
tients will have greater choice among physicians).
50 See Private Contracting in Medicare: Hearing on S. 1194 Before the Senate
Committee on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998), available in LEXIS, Committee Hearing
Transcripts Library, Federal News Service file (statement of Nancy-Ann Min De-
Parle, Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration).
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cial liabilities prior to treatment. In addition, the opt-out period
will protect the patient-doctor relationship by reducing possible
coercion to contract privately. Selective private contracting, on the
other hand, would erode the system of financial protections Medi-
care otherwise affords beneficiaries. Furthermore, selective private
contracting would endanger access to care by facilitating preferen-
tial treatment for beneficiaries willing to contract privately, creat-
ing a two-tier system with different standards of care for low and
middle-to-high income beneficiaries. Finally, the administrator
supported the two-year opt-out provision as enacted because it
struck the appropriate balance between protecting beneficiaries
and permitting physicians the flexibility to charge higher fees.
51
Beatrice Braun, a board member of the AARP, testified that
the two-year opt-out provision is necessary to preserve the Medi-
care program's integrity and consumer protections. 52 Selective pri-
vate contracting would enhance the potential for fraud and abuse
because it would frustrate monitoring of privately contracted
services. The AARP believes that private contracting would pose
particular problems for monitoring billing for services offered un-
der Medicare+Choice plans, where physicians could privately
contract for services already covered by capitated payments. Un-
limited private contracting also threatens to increase beneficiary
costs because private contracts are not subject to balance billing
limitations. Finally, the AARP believes that the existing two-year
opt-out provision expands a beneficiary's options without sacri-
ficing important beneficiary protections.53
Kent Masterson Brown, counsel for the United Seniors Asso-
ciation, testified that the two-year opt-out provision poses a great
barrier to private contracting, which is the only "escape valve"
from HCFA's highly rationed coverage for medical services. 54
51 See id.
52 See Private Contracting in Medicare: Hearing on S. 1194 Before the Senate
Committee on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998), available in LEXIS, Committee Hearing
Transcripts Library, Federal News Service file (statement of Beatrice Braun, M.D.,
Board Member of the American Association of Retired Persons) (discussing the pos-
sible disadvantages to Senator Kyl's proposed legislation to limit the Medicare pri-
vate contracting provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997).
53 See id.
54 See Private Contracting in Medicare: Hearing on S. 1194 Before the Senate
Committee on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998), available in LEXIS, Committee Hearing
Transcripts Library, Federal News Service file (statement of Kent Masterson Brown,
Counsel, United Seniors Assoc., Inc.) (arguing that private contracting is necessary to
ensure that Medicare beneficiaries can make choices regarding their health care and
to maintain the quality of Medicare programs).
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Brown was very critical of HCFA for: (1) prohibiting private con-
tracting without a clear statutory basis; (2) failing to articulate
clear policies; (3) creating disincentives for physicians to provide
care that comports with the standards of the medical profession;
and (4) denying coverage for a number of essential health services.
According to Brown, private contracting offers the only viable al-
ternative to what the United Seniors Association believes is a pa-
ternalistic program that denies seniors the choice to make personal
payments for their health care.55
Dr. William A. Reynolds testified that the American College
of Physicians is in favor of increasing freedom of choice and flexi-
bility, but opposes the repeal of the two-year opt-out provision be-
cause of concerns that repeal would limit patient access to physi-
cians accepting Medicare, that it would complicate billing proce-
dures for physicians and expose them to fraud and abuse sanctions,
and that discussions of liability for services would introduce con-
flict in the physician/patient relationship.56
In the months following the hearings, Senator Kyl was unable
to rally sufficient support for the bill. One of his efforts to mobi-
lize support served to gauge where the Senate stood on the meas-
ure. On April 1, 1998, during the floor debate on the budget plan,
the Senate approved by fifty-one to forty-seven a non-binding
"Sense of Congress" amendment to the FY 1999 budget resolution,
declaring that seniors should have the freedom to contract pri-
vately.57
But by late April 1998, although the bill had forty-nine co-
sponsors in the Senate and 193 co-sponsors in the House, it lacked
the support of Republican Senators John Chafee (R-RI) and Jim
Jeffords (R-VT) on the Senate Finance Committee. Without these
5 See id.
"6 See Private Contracting in Medicare: Hearing on S. 1194 Before the Senate
Committee on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998), available in LEXIS, Committee Hearing
Transcripts Library, Federal News Service file (highlighting the statement of Dr.
Reynolds, president of the American College of Physicians on problems of private
contracting in S. 1194).
57 See S. Con. Res. 86, 105th Cong. (1998). The resolution states, in relevant
part:
It is the sense of Congress that seniors have the right to see the physician or
health care provider of their choice and not be limited in such right by the
imposition of such unreasonable conditions on providers who are willing to
treat seniors on a private basis, and that the assumptions underlying the
functional totals in this resolution assume that legislation will be enacted to
assure this right.
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senators behind the bill, Senator Kyl saw little chance that it would
be able to leave the Committee. 8 Moreover, the recent "Sense of
Congress" resolution indicated that the bill was nine votes short of
sixty votes it needed in the Senate to go to cloture.5 9 Senate bill
1194 did not progress any further in the 105 th Congress? °
VIII. THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS
On November 2, 1998, as the 105 th Congress wound down to
adjournment, HCFA published its final rule with comments on
Section 4507.61 The rule included ancillary policies that HCFA
stated it believed were necessary to clarify what it means when a
physician or practitioner opts out of Medicare.
As a first matter, HCFA stated in the opening comments that
the private contracting rules did not apply to individuals who only
have Medicare Part A, to individuals over age sixty-five who do
not have Medicare, or to services Medicare does not cover. In re-
gard to the last category - services Medicare does not cover -
HCFA stated that when a physician or practitioner furnishes a
service that is not reasonable and necessary under Medicare's cri-
teria, there are no limits on what the physician or practitioner may
charge the beneficiary. In these situations an advance beneficiary
notice (ABN) must be furnished to the patient indicating the likeli-
hood that Medicare will deny the claim. However, HCFA indicated
an ABN is not the equivalent of a private contract and does not
result in an opt-out of Medicare. HCFA also stated that for serv-
ices Medicare categorically does not cover (such as cosmetic sur-
gery and routine physical examinations), a private contract under
Section 4507 is not necessary and thus, the two-year opt-out is not
required.
Moreover, when a Medicare beneficiary enrolls in a Medi-
care+Choice managed care plan and does not adhere to the plan's
rules (such as seeking care from a non-network physician if cover-
age is limited to network physicians), the physician may charge the
beneficiary without regard to the limiting charge and without
needing a private contract or an opt-out of Medicare. Medi-
58 See Kyl et al., supra note 29.
59 See id.
60 See generally Jonathan Gardner, Fitting the Bills: AMA: Private Contracting
is Out, Patient Protection and Tobacco Control Are In, MOD. HEALTHCARF, June 8,
1998, at 27 (noting that Senator Kyl conceded defeat of S. 1194 for that year).
61 See Medicare Program, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,814, 58,850 (1998) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. Part 405).
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care+Choice organizations were prohibited under the final rule
from contracting with or paying physicians or practitioners who
opt-out (except for beneficiaries seeking care for emergency con-
ditions) and were required to check with the Medicare carriers to
acquire the names of the opting out physicians and practitioners.
However, HCFA drew a distinction between the forgoing
situations and one where services are furnished and no claim for
benefits is submitted by either the physician or the beneficiary.
Commenters had argued that private contracting was valid in these
circumstances and did not require adherence to Section 4507 and
the two-year opt-out requirement. HCFA disagreed, maintaining
that no private contracting is valid except as specified in Section
4507. The mandatory submission rules of Section 1848(g)(4), ef-
fective September 1, 1990, precluded any simple circumstances
where no claim for benefits is made. This section required the
completion of a claim form by participating physicians and suppli-
ers. Additionally, Section 1848(g)(1)(A)(i) flatly prohibited par-
ticipating physicians and suppliers from charging more than the
limiting charge. For these reasons, HCFA concluded, private con-
tracting outside of Section 4507 is precluded.
HCFA also clarified that a physician or practitioner need not
opt-out of Medicare to furnish charitable care, that is, services for
which they do not charge or services for which they waive the co-
payment or deductible because of the beneficiary's indigence.
While the final rule did not require that physicians and practi-
tioners provide advance notice to beneficiaries that they have
opted out, HCFA encouraged notification to beneficiaries at the
time an appointment is made. The final rule specified fifteen re-
quirements for the private contract to be entered into between the
beneficiary and the physician or practitioner and ten requirements
for the opt-out affidavit to be filed with each Medicare carrier with
which the physician or practitioner would file claims in the ab-
sence of the opt-out. Nonparticipating physicians were allowed to
opt-out at any time, provided that affidavit was filed within ten
days of signing a private contract with a Medicare beneficiary.
Participating physicians were allowed to opt-out on a quarterly
basis when Medicare carriers make system changes.
IX. THE COURT CHALLENGE
The Secretary's implementing regulations came just in time to
avert a possible ruling from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
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trict of Columbia Circuit that Section 4507 was unconstitutional on
a number of grounds. In United Seniors Association, Inc. v. Sha-
lala,62 the federal district court was presented with a request by the
plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement
of Section 4507. The plaintiffs contended that the law denied them
a liberty interest to contract privately for health care services with-
out government intrusion. The plaintiffs maintained that prior to
the passage of Section 4507, Medicare beneficiaries could contract
privately with physicians on a case-by-case basis and that the two-
year opt-out provision in the recently enacted Section 4507 effec-
tively precluded any physician from agreeing to contract privately.
The district court did not rule on whether Medicare beneficiaries
did or did not have a right to contract privately prior to enactment
of Section 4507, a point disputed by the government in its defense.
Instead, the district court ruled that the constitutional right to
autonomous decision making was limited to child rearing and edu-
cation, family relationships, procreation, marriage, contraception.
and abortion. The court declined to extend the right to the right to
pay for medical services outside of the Medicare Program's rules.
Additionally, the court ruled that Congress had not overstepped its
authority under the Spending Clause of the Constitution,6 nor had
it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because age is not a suspect class and the government had a
rational basis to limit the amount that Medicare beneficiaries pay
for services. Thus, the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion was denied and the defendant's motion for summary judgment
was granted.
The plaintiffs then took their case to the Court of Appeals,
which found that it did not have to rule on the merits of the plain-
tiffs' constitutional claims.64 In the period of time between the
lower court case and the appeal, the Secretary had clarified her
interpretation of Section 4507 in the briefs filed with the court and
in the implementing regulations. 65 The Secretary agreed that if a
doctor and beneficiary agree that a service would not be reim-
bursed by Medicare either because it is categorically excluded or
because it is deemed not medically necessary or reasonable by
Medicare criteria, then Section 4507 does not apply, the patient
may pay the physician's charge for the service, and the physician
62 2 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 1998).
63 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.1.
64 See United Seniors Ass'n v. Shalala, 182 F. 3d 965, 969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
65 See Medicare Program, supra note 61, at 58, 851.
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does not have to opt-out for the two-year period. By so doing, the
Secretary undercut the plaintiffs' argument that Medicare benefici-
aries have a constitutional right to obtain services they cannot get
from Medicare. The plaintiffs agreed at oral argument that "if Sec-
tion 4507 really sa[id] what the Secretary sa[id] it sa[id], then their
case [was] at an end." 66 The Court of Appeals found the Secre-
tary's interpretation of the less-than-plain language of Section
4507 to be reasonable and affirmed the lower court's order.
X. CONCLUSION
The Kyl Amendment began in Congress as a crusade against
government interference, a crusade for the rights of older Ameri-
cans and their physicians to contract privately. However, what was
reviewed as a private right by some was viewed by others as an
opportunity for physicians to withhold the benefits of a vital gov-
ernment program from vulnerable seniors. Moreover, the massive
bureaucracy of the Medicare Program does not accommodate pa-
tient-by-patient arrangements easily. As it has now evolved, the
Kyl Amendment focuses not on the rights of Medicare beneficiar-
ies, but rather on the practices of physicians. If physicians treat
Medicare beneficiaries, then they must extend the benefits of the
Medicare Program to them all. If they choose to withdraw from the
Medicare Program, then physicians must do so for all of their
Medicare patients. Their decision is not irreversible and can be
changed at two-year intervals. A crusade for rights has been tem-
pered by the realities of a complex, but beneficent government
program. The debate about the balance between the two appears to
be settled. The rules are clearer than they were before the Kyl
Amendment. For now, that appears to be enough.
United Seniors Ass'n, supra note 64, at 970.
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